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interpretation. It is possible, however, that the novel language of
"reasonable alternatives" has provided a method for carte blanche
invalidation of state statutes, undercutting the time-honored formula of the Cooley case. 42 Even though the Cities Service case
minimizes this possibility, a case with a fact situation similar to
the Dean case might well attract the Court to utilize "reasonable
alternatives," thereafter its expansion into doctrine being but a
matter of judicial discretion. Such an eventuality would be a
usurpation of legislative function by the judiciary.
William H. Parker
EFFECT OF RESPONSIVE VERDICT STATUTEINDICTMENTS-FORMER JEOPARDY

On February 11, 1948, defendant was indicted for manslaughter. The following week a jury of twelve returned a verdict of
negligent homicide, which was responsive to the charge of manslaughter at that time.' The conviction and sentence were set
aside on June 15, 1948, and the case was remanded for a new
trial. 2 Some twenty months later, on February 13, 1950, defendant was arraigned under the same indictment, but only on the
charge of negligent homicide. His counsel objected to the arraignment, protesting that there was no written charge accusing him
of negligent homicide for the reason that negligent homicide was
no longer responsive to, nor included in, a charge of manslaughter.3 This objection was overruled, along with the subsequent
objections to the clerk's reading of the manslaughter indictment,
with the negligent homicide verdict endorsed on the back, to the
jury, and the court's permitting the jury to retire to the jury
room with the indictment and prior conviction endorsed thereon.
Held, that it was proper to arraign defendant under the original
manslaughter indictment, and try him for negligent homicide.
State v. Crittenden, 49 So. 2d 418 (La. 1950).
The appellant's contention that the use of the original indictment with the endorsement of the negligent homicide verdict
commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local
interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the
prevention of state restrictions." (71 S. Ct. 215, 220.) This opinion was written
by Mr. Justice Clark, as was that of the Dean case.

42. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
1. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 147 of
1942.
2. State v. Crittenden, 214 La. 81, 36 So. 2d 645 (1948).
3. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 161 of
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was prejudicial to his case was not considered at length by the
court. Although there may be merit in saying that a jury will be
prejudiced by the knowledge that a prior jury has found the defendant guilty of the crime now charged against him, 4 it seems fairly
well settled that this incidental knowledge of the former conviction is of no consequence, so long as the jury is properly instructed
as to the true legal situation. 5
The principal issue confronting the court in the instant case
related to the appellant's contention that the original manslaughter indictment could not serve as a valid charge for the lesser
crime of negligent homicide. The new responsive verdict statute6
had eliminated negligent homicide as a responsive verdict of manslaughter, and at the time of the second trial a conviction of negligent homicide under a manslaughter indictment would not have
been possible. Since Act 161 of 1948 had been recognized as a
procedural statute which affected trials held after its effective
date regardless of when the criminal act took place, 7 the defense
counsel argued that only an indictment specifically charging negligent homicide could carry the charge of the offense at the time
of the second trial. It was contended that the original indictment
was no longer valid and that the negligent homicide charge given
orally by the judge at the arraignment did not satisfy the statutory requirement that all criminal prosecutions be accompanied
by a written charge.8
The supreme court, however, refused to be persuaded by
this line of reasoning. Rather, it concluded that a scope of the
manslaughter indictment, that is, whether it included a charge
of negligent homicide, was to be determined by the law in effect
when it was returned on February 11, 1948. 9 For proper under4. Art. 515, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, states: "The effect of granting
a new trial is to set at large everything connected with the trial, and merely
to grant a retrial of the case, with as little prejudice to either party as if it
has never been tried."
5. State v. Wooten, 136 La. 560, 67 So. 366 (1915).
6. La. Act 161 of 1948.
7. State v. Williams, 216 La. 419, 423, 43 So. 2d 780, 781 (1949), in which it
was stated, as to La. Act 161 of 1948, "Clearly this act has relation to nothing
more than the course of the trial proceedings." And further, "It has long been
established that statutes which make changes in matters relating merely to
practice and procedure in the courts control trials had after the effective date
thereof without regard to the date of the happening of the events which give
rise to the proceedings." (216 La. 419, 422, 43 So. 2d 780, 781.)
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9; Art. 2, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
9. The court did not say this in so many words, but it merely disposed of
the issue by stating that the principle of the case of State v. Smith, 49 La.
Ann. 1515, 22 So. 882 (1897), offered a complete parallel and was ruling in the
Crittenden case. In the Smith case the previous murder indictment was used
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standing of the court's conclusion, two factors should be considered: (1) the status of the old manslaughter indictment at the
time the 1948 responsive verdict statute became effective, and
(2) the effect in general of procedural statutes.
Preceding the original trial, when defendant was arraigned
for manslaughter, he was, in legal contemplation, also arraigned
for the lesser and included offense of negligent homicide. 10 Although the district attorney attempted to prove the greater crime,
he was proceeding under an indictment that was valid and sufficient for the charge of negligent homicide as well. When the
verdict of negligent homicide was returned, the charge of man-.
slaughter, in effect, was erased from the indictment, but a valid
charge of negligent homicide remained pending." This charge
was no less valid than one which might have been returned by a
grand jury immediately following the reversal. If the scope of
the original indictment is to be governed by the law in effect
when it was found by the grand jury, then it follows that the
defendant still stood charged with negligent homicide at the
time of the retrial. It is significant that Act 161 of 1948 did not
become effective until several weeks after the reversal and remanding of the case. Consequently, since Act 161 of 1948 does
not repeal the statute declaring negligent homicide to be a crime
and is merely procedural in nature, 12 it should not operate retrospectively to the extent of affecting a valid charge (regardless of
its source) pending at the time of its passage. Of course, it would
govern the scope of all charges brought after its effective date.
A hypothetical situation might here serve as an illustration. Suppose an indictment had been returned by a nine out of twelve
vote of a grand jury. After the indictment, but prior to the trial,
a statute was enacted requiring a unanimous indictment. Although it could not be denied that a defendant's chances of escaping indictment were greater under the new statute, it is offered
that it would not have nullified the indictment then pending. Yet
it would be obvious that at the time of the trial in the hypothetical
case, an indictment returned by a nine out of twelve vote would
be without legal efficacy.
in the new trial for manslaughter, and the court said that "neither law nor
jurisprudence requires that he could only legally be tried on a new indictment
specially charging manslaughter." (49 La. Ann. 1515, 1520, 22 So. 882, 884.)
10. State v. Bourgeois, 158 La. 713, 104 So. 627 (1925).
11. State v. Dunn, 41 La. Ann. 612, 6 So. 176 (1889); State v. West, 45 La.
Ann. 928, 13 So. 173 (1893); State v. Smith, 49 La. Ann. 1515, 22 So. 882 (1897);
State v. Wooten, 136 La. 560, 67 So. 366 (1915); State v. Harville, 171 La. 256,
130 So. 348 (1930).
12. State v. Williams, 216 La. 419, 43 So. 2d 780 (1949).
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While the problem presented to the court in the Crittenden
case as to the effect of Act 161 of 1948 upon a pending indictment
was unique and without judicial precedent, it is not of great importance because of the slight possibility of its recurrence. Of
more significance is the question (not raised in the Crittenden
case) as to the double jeopardy aspects of the new responsive
verdict statute. For example, if the Crittenden trial were held
today and the jury should find the defendant "not guilty" of manslaughter, would a subsequent trial for negligent homicide be
barred by a plea of former jeopardy?
The prohibition against one's being placed twice in jeopardy
for the same offense first appeared in Louisiana in statutory form
in 1864, although the concept had been borrowed from the common law prior to that time. The present Constitution of Louisiana
provides, "nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or
liberty for the same offense, except on his own application for a
new trial, or where there is a mistrial, or a motion in arrest of
'3
judgment is sustained.'
The jurisprudence of this state has failed to contribute any
inclusive and easily applied formula which may be used to determine the issue of former jeopardy. Instead, a number of tests or
rules have been advanced in the cases. In the leading case of
State v. Foster,14 three different tests were stated with approval.
The "same evidence" formula was set forth with the declaration
that " 'The test whether the plea of autrefois acquit is a sufficient
bar in any particular case is whether the evidence necessary to
support the second indictment would have been sufficient to have
procured a legal conviction on the first.' "' The "substantial identity" test was expressed in the following manner: "'To render
the plea of a former acquittal a bar, it must be a legal acquittal
...for substantially the same offense. . . .' While formal, tech13. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9. Th'e- slmilar provision found in the Federal Constitution does not apply to prosecutions under state laws. Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1939).
This constitutional guarantee is restated in Art. 276, La. Code of Crim.
Proc. of 1928. The facts required to constitute former jeopardy are outlined
in Art. 279, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, which states: "To constitute
former jeopardy it is necessary . . . that the offense formerly charged and
that presently charged are either identical, or different grades of the same
offense, or that the one is necessarily included in the other."
Art. 5, La. Crim. Code of 1942, states that the "offender who commits an
offense which includes all the elements of other lesser offenses, may be prosecuted for and convicted of either the greater offense or one of the lesser and
included offenses." (Italics supplied.) It is to be noted that this article does
not provide for dual prosecutions in such cases.
14. 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
15. 156 La. 891, 897, 101 So. 255, 258.
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nical, and absolute identity of the offenses is not necessary, yet
substantial identity is an essential element in support of the plea
of autrefois acquit."'16 The court's opinion also approved a further
test, being "'whether on the former trial the accused could have
been convicted of the crime charged against him on the second.' "17
Different approaches have been taken by other jurisdictions and
text writers.18
In dealing with lesser and included offenses, such as those
covered by Article 5 of the Criminal Code, it would probably be
most appropriate to apply the "same evidence" test, or the test of
"whether, on the first trial, there could haVe been a conviction of
the offense prosecuted in the second." Both of these tests were
relied upon by the Pennsylvania court when, in the early case of
Hiland v. Commonwealth, 9 it was confronted with a plea of former jeopardy arising from an acquittal of manslaughter and a
subsequent indictment and trial for involuntary manslaughter.
In that case, it was said,
"The first indictment charged murder. Under it he [the
defendant] might have been convicted of murder of the first
or second degree, or of voluntary manslaughter, but not of
involuntary manslaughter. The latter offense is a misdemeanor. It must be charged as such, and cannot be included
in an indictment charging felonious homicide excepting in
the case of an indictment for voluntary manslaughter, where
it may be joined.... It follows that when the defendant was
put upon his trial for murder, he was placed in no jeopardy
' 20
of a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
A similar situation in Louisiana, where a trial for a lesser and
included offense was held not to be barred by the former acquittal
2
of the greater offense, is presented in the case of State v. Neal. '
The defendant, a delinquent juvenile, had been tried and ac16. Ibid.
17. 156 La. 891, 898, 101 So. 255, 258.
18. Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases 145, 146
(29 ed. 1934): "The principle on which the right of autrefois acqut . . .
depends is that a man.shall not be put twice in jeopardy for the same matter."
(Italics supplied.) Also, in the same text, the following appears, "Whether the
facts are the same in both trials is not a true test: the test is rather whether
the acquittal on the first charge necessarily involves an acquittal on the
second charge."
19. 114 Pa. St. 372, 6 Atl. 267 (1886). The reasoning of the Hilands case
was followed in the more recent case of Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa.
Super. 484, 45 A. 2d 235 (1946).
20. 114 Pa. St. 372, 380, 6 Atl. 267, 268.
21. 169 La. 441, 125 So. 442 (1929).
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quitted of assault with intent to commit rape, which crime was
a felony and therefore subjected the youth to the jurisdiction of
the criminal court. Later, upon being tried in the juvenile court
for mere assault, defendant pleaded autrefois acquit, which was
overruled, the supreme court affirming the ruling on appeal and
saying:
"the acquittal of the defendant of the crime of assault with
intent to commit rape was a valid acquittal, because the
indictment for that crime was a valid indictment, but the conviction of the mere assault, without intent to commit rape,
was not a valid conviction, because the defendant was not
subject to indictment for that offense. The subsequent trial
and conviction of the defendant in the juvenile court, as a
delinquent juvenile, for having committed the assault upon
the girl, were valid, notwithstanding the assault was the same
assault for which the defendant was legally indicted and
tried and acquitted of the crime of assault with intent to
22
commit rape.1
Here a second trial was permissible for the "same assault" because
the court lacked jurisdiction in the first instance to return a conviction of the included and lesser offensel of simple assault
charged in the second.
Prior to 1948 all lesser and included offenses were responsive
verdicts. The courts were charged with the responsibility of deciding the question in each case, and considerable difficulty was frequently encountered in determining whether a greater offense
"necessarily included all the elements of the lesser. '23 The 1948
responsive verdict statute eliminated this confusion by a legislative determination of the appropriate responsive verdicts. Thus,
a defendant on trial for manslaughter can no longer be convicted
of negligent homicide. If our courts follow the test applied by
the Pennsylvania court in the Hiland case, and also stated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in the Neal case, the defendant may
be subsequently charged with negligent homicide and will be
unable to validly plead former jeopardy. He has never been on
24
trial or subject to possible conviction of that crime.
22. 169 La. 441, 445, 125 So. 442, 443.
23. See State v. Murphy, 214 La. 600, 38 So. 2d 254 (1948); State v. Poe,
214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948). For an interesting discussion on this problem,
see Comment, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 603 (1944).
24. It is submitted that Art. 5, La. Crim. Code of 1942, and Art. 279, La.
Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, are modified to this extent.
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However, it should be recognized that this application of the
responsive verdict statute subjects a defendant to the possibility
of two trials for a single homicide, and it may be argued that the
second posecution is contrary to the real spirit of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Had there been a conviction of manslaughter, surely the defendant could not have been
subsequently tried for negligent homicide. Thus it is apparent
that two distinct offenses have not been committed in the same
act-either there has been a manslaughter or a negligent homicide. In the early Louisiana case of State v. Cheevers,2 5 it was
stated that "no man shall be punished twice for the same criminal
act." If this test is to determine the scope of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy, then it logically follows that
this right should not be restricted by the new statutory responsive
verdict limitations. This approach, however, is somewhat weakened by the court's holding in the recent case of State v. Mitchell.26
In that case the defendant was convicted of simple assault, and
subsequently tried and convicted of cruelty to juveniles, both
convictions being predicated upon the same attack upon a sixteen
year old boy. The Mitchell case was not argued on appeal and
may not be entitled to any great weight,27 but it at least casts a
doubt upon the rule stated in the Cheevers decision that there shall
be only one trial for a single criminal act.
Winfred G. Boriack
LABOR LAW-STATE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION ACT INVALID FOR
CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Transit workers were fined for disobeying an anti-strike
restraining order obtained by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, under the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law.'
This law substitutes for collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration upon order of the Wisconsin board whenever an impasse
is reached in disputes between employees and management of
public utilities. It prohibits strikes in public utilities and makes
disobedience of restraining orders punishable by fine. Held, the
Wisconsin act conflicts with Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 as amended by the Labor Management Act of
25. 7 La. Ann. 40, 41 (1852).
26. 210 La. 1078, 29 So. 2d 162 (1946).

27. The Mitchell case was discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Criminal Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LA.W
RE vEw 290 (1948).

1. Wis. Stat. (1947) § 111.50 et seq.

